On The Soul
body as such.
We must not understand by that which is 'potentially capable of
living' what has lost the soul it had, but only what still retains it;
but seeds and fruits are bodies which possess the qualification.
Consequently, while waking is actuality in a sense corresponding to
the cutting and the seeing, the soul is actuality in the sense
corresponding to the power of sight and the power in the tool; the
body corresponds to what exists in potentiality; as the pupil plus the
power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the body
constitutes the animal.
From this it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from
its body, or at any rate that certain parts of it are (if it has
parts) for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the
actualities of their bodily parts. Yet some may be separable because
they are not the actualities of any body at all. Further, we have no
light on the problem whether the soul may not be the actuality of
its body in the sense in which the sailor is the actuality of the
This must suffice as our sketch or outline determination of the
nature of soul.
Since what is clear or logically more evident emerges from what in
itself is confused but more observable by us, we must reconsider our
results from this point of view. For it is not enough for a definitive
formula to express as most now do the mere fact; it must include and
exhibit the ground also. At present definitions are given in a form
analogous to the conclusion of a syllogism; e.g. What is squaring? The
construction of an equilateral rectangle equal to a given oblong
rectangle. Such a definition is in form equivalent to a conclusion.
One that tells us that squaring is the discovery of a line which is