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On The Soul   

The so-called abstract objects the mind thinks just as, if one had

thought of the snubnosed not as snub-nosed but as hollow, one would

have thought of an actuality without the flesh in which it is

embodied: it is thus that the mind when it is thinking the objects

of Mathematics thinks as separate elements which do not exist

separate. In every case the mind which is actively thinking is the

objects which it thinks. Whether it is possible for it while not

existing separate from spatial conditions to think anything that is

separate, or not, we must consider later.


Let us now summarize our results about soul, and repeat that the

soul is in a way all existing things; for existing things are either

sensible or thinkable, and knowledge is in a way what is knowable, and

sensation is in a way what is sensible: in what way we must inquire.

Knowledge and sensation are divided to correspond with the

realities, potential knowledge and sensation answering to

potentialities, actual knowledge and sensation to actualities.

Within the soul the faculties of knowledge and sensation are

potentially these objects, the one what is knowable, the other what is

sensible. They must be either the things themselves or their forms.

The former alternative is of course impossible: it is not the stone

which is present in the soul but its form.

It follows that the soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand

is a tool of tools, so the mind is the form of forms and sense the

form of sensible things.

Since according to common agreement there is nothing outside and

separate in existence from sensible spatial magnitudes, the objects of

thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects

and all the states and affections of sensible things. Hence (1) no one

can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, and (when

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