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On The Soul   

the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it

along with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except in

that they contain no matter.

Imagination is different from assertion and denial; for what is true

or false involves a synthesis of concepts. In what will the primary

concepts differ from images? Must we not say that neither these nor

even our other concepts are images, though they necessarily involve



The soul of animals is characterized by two faculties, (a) the

faculty of discrimination which is the work of thought and sense,

and (b) the faculty of originating local movement. Sense and mind we

have now sufficiently examined. Let us next consider what it is in the

soul which originates movement. Is it a single part of the soul

separate either spatially or in definition? Or is it the soul as a

whole? If it is a part, is that part different from those usually

distinguished or already mentioned by us, or is it one of them? The

problem at once presents itself, in what sense we are to speak of

parts of the soul, or how many we should distinguish. For in a sense

there is an infinity of parts: it is not enough to distinguish, with

some thinkers, the calculative, the passionate, and the

desiderative, or with others the rational and the irrational; for if

we take the dividing lines followed by these thinkers we shall find

parts far more distinctly separated from one another than these,

namely those we have just mentioned: (1) the nutritive, which

belongs both to plants and to all animals, and (2) the sensitive,

which cannot easily be classed as either irrational or rational;

further (3) the imaginative, which is, in its being, different from

all, while it is very hard to say with which of the others it is the

same or not the same, supposing we determine to posit separate parts

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