Home | Texts by category | | Quick Search:   
Works by Aristotle
Pages of On The Soul

Previous | Next

On The Soul   

justification for regarding these two as the sources of movement, i.e.

appetite and practical thought; for the object of appetite starts a

movement and as a result of that thought gives rise to movement, the

object of appetite being it a source of stimulation. So too when

imagination originates movement, it necessarily involves appetite.

That which moves therefore is a single faculty and the faculty of

appetite; for if there had been two sources of movement-mind and

appetite-they would have produced movement in virtue of some common

character. As it is, mind is never found producing movement without

appetite (for wish is a form of appetite; and when movement is

produced according to calculation it is also according to wish), but

appetite can originate movement contrary to calculation, for desire is

a form of appetite. Now mind is always right, but appetite and

imagination may be either right or wrong. That is why, though in any

case it is the object of appetite which originates movement, this

object may be either the real or the apparent good. To produce

movement the object must be more than this: it must be good that can

be brought into being by action; and only what can be otherwise than

as it is can thus be brought into being. That then such a power in the

soul as has been described, i.e. that called appetite, originates

movement is clear. Those who distinguish parts in the soul, if they

distinguish and divide in accordance with differences of power, find

themselves with a very large number of parts, a nutritive, a

sensitive, an intellective, a deliberative, and now an appetitive

part; for these are more different from one another than the faculties

of desire and passion.

Since appetites run counter to one another, which happens when a

principle of reason and a desire are contrary and is possible only

in beings with a sense of time (for while mind bids us hold back

because of what is future, desire is influenced by what is just at

hand: a pleasant object which is just at hand presents itself as

both pleasant and good, without condition in either case, because of

Previous | Next
Site Search