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On The Soul   


want of foresight into what is farther away in time), it follows

that while that which originates movement must be specifically one,

viz. the faculty of appetite as such (or rather farthest back of all

the object of that faculty; for it is it that itself remaining unmoved

originates the movement by being apprehended in thought or

imagination), the things that originate movement are numerically many.

All movement involves three factors, (1) that which originates the

movement, (2) that by means of which it originates it, and (3) that

which is moved. The expression 'that which originates the movement' is

ambiguous: it may mean either (a) something which itself is unmoved or

(b) that which at once moves and is moved. Here that which moves

without itself being moved is the realizable good, that which at

once moves and is moved is the faculty of appetite (for that which

is influenced by appetite so far as it is actually so influenced is

set in movement, and appetite in the sense of actual appetite is a

kind of movement), while that which is in motion is the animal. The

instrument which appetite employs to produce movement is no longer

psychical but bodily: hence the examination of it falls within the

province of the functions common to body and soul. To state the matter

summarily at present, that which is the instrument in the production

of movement is to be found where a beginning and an end coincide as

e.g. in a ball and socket joint; for there the convex and the

concave sides are respectively an end and a beginning (that is why

while the one remains at rest, the other is moved): they are

separate in definition but not separable spatially. For everything

is moved by pushing and pulling. Hence just as in the case of a wheel,

so here there must be a point which remains at rest, and from that

point the movement must originate.

To sum up, then, and repeat what I have said, inasmuch as an

animal is capable of appetite it is capable of self-movement; it is

not capable of appetite without possessing imagination; and all

imagination is either (1) calculative or (2) sensitive. In the

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