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On The Soul   

latter an animals, and not only man, partake.


We must consider also in the case of imperfect animals, sc. those

which have no sense but touch, what it is that in them originates

movement. Can they have imagination or not? or desire? Clearly they

have feelings of pleasure and pain, and if they have these they must

have desire. But how can they have imagination? Must not we say

that, as their movements are indefinite, they have imagination and

desire, but indefinitely?

Sensitive imagination, as we have said, is found in all animals,

deliberative imagination only in those that are calculative: for

whether this or that shall be enacted is already a task requiring

calculation; and there must be a single standard to measure by, for

that is pursued which is greater. It follows that what acts in this

way must be able to make a unity out of several images.

This is the reason why imagination is held not to involve opinion,

in that it does not involve opinion based on inference, though opinion

involves imagination. Hence appetite contains no deliberative element.

Sometimes it overpowers wish and sets it in movement: at times wish

acts thus upon appetite, like one sphere imparting its movement to

another, or appetite acts thus upon appetite, i.e. in the condition of

moral weakness (though by nature the higher faculty is always more

authoritative and gives rise to movement). Thus three modes of

movement are possible.

The faculty of knowing is never moved but remains at rest. Since the

one premiss or judgement is universal and the other deals with the

particular (for the first tells us that such and such a kind of man

should do such and such a kind of act, and the second that this is

an act of the kind meant, and I a person of the type intended), it

is the latter opinion that really originates movement, not the

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