That has been shown.
But if the one had any other affection than that of being one, it
would be affected in such a way as to be more than one; which is
Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either
with another or with itself?
Then it cannot be like another, or like itself?
Nor can it be affected so as to be other, for then it would be
affected in such a way as to be more than one.
That which is affected otherwise than itself or another, will be
unlike itself or another, for sameness of affections is likeness.
But the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise, is never
unlike itself or other?
Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other?
Again, being of this nature, it can neither be equal nor unequal
either to itself or to other.
How is that?
Why, because the one if equal must be of the same measures as that
to which it is equal.
And if greater or less than things which are commensurable with
it, the one will have more measures than that which is less, and fewer
than that which is greater?
And so of things which are not commensurate with it, the one will