hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have
In this way:-If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and
one of being, if being is one; and if being and one are not the
same; and since the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the
whole, if it is one, itself be, and have for its parts, one and being?
And is each of these parts-one and being to be simply called a part,
or must the word "part" be relative to the word "whole"?
Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?
Again, of the parts of the one, if it is-I mean being and one-does
either fail to imply the other? is the one wanting to being, or
being to the one?
Thus, each of the parts also has in turn both one and being, and
is at the least made up of two parts; and the same principle goes on
for ever, and every part whatever has always these two parts; for
being always involves one, and one being; so that one is always
disappearing, and becoming two.
And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity?
Let us take another direction.
We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is?
And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be