But now, let us abstract the one which, as we say, partakes of
being, and try to imagine it apart from that of which, as we say, it
partakes-will this abstract one be one only or many?
One, I think.
Let us see:-Must not the being of one be other than one? for the one
is not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being?
If being and the one be two different things, it is not because
the one is one that it is other than being; nor because being is being
that it is other than the one; but they differ from one another in
virtue of otherness and difference.
So that the other is not the same either with the one or with being?
And therefore whether we take being and the other, or being and
the one, or the one and the other, in every such case we take two
things, which may be rightly called both.
In this way-you may speak of being?
And also of one?
Then now we have spoken of either of them?
Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both?
And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the
other-in any such case do I not speak of both?
And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?
And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one?