into the greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into
parts more than the one, into parts equal to the one; the one is never
wanting to being, or being to the one, but being two they are co-equal
Certainly that is true.
The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being,
is many and infinite?
Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself
distributed by being, must also be many?
Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a
whole, will be limited; for are not the parts contained the whole?
And that which contains, is a limit?
Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts,
having limits and yet unlimited in number?
And because having limits, also having extremes?
And if a whole, having beginning and middle and end. For can
anything be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is
wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?
Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end.
But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or
it would not be in the middle?
Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or
a union of the two?