But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older
and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and
Of course it must.
Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is
becoming and will become?
And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to
it and belongs to it?
And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and
perception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception
Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and
expressed, and everything of this kind which appertains to other:
things appertains to the one.
Certainly, that is true.
Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is
both one and many, as we have described, and is, neither one nor many,
and participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at
times partake of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not
partake of being?
But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not
partake of being when partaking of being?
Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different
times, for that is the only way in which it can partake and not
partake of the same.