Welcome
   Home | Texts by category | | Quick Search:   
Authors
Works by Plato
Pages of parmenides



Previous | Next
                  

parmenides   


Certainly.

But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older

and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and

the future?

Of course it must.

Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is

becoming and will become?

Certainly.

And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to

it and belongs to it?

True.

And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and

perception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception

of it?

Quite right.

Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and

expressed, and everything of this kind which appertains to other:

things appertains to the one.

Certainly, that is true.



Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is

both one and many, as we have described, and is, neither one nor many,

and participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at

times partake of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not

partake of being?

Certainly.

But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not

partake of being when partaking of being?

Impossible.

Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different

times, for that is the only way in which it can partake and not

partake of the same.

Previous | Next
Site Search