And surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can be at once
neither in motion nor at rest?
But neither can it change without changing.
When then does it change; for it cannot change either when at
rest, or when in motion, or when in time?
And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing
The moment. For the moment seems to imply a something out of which
change takes place into either of two states; for the change is not
from the state of rest as such, nor, from the state of motion as such;
but there is this curious nature, which we call the moment lying
between rest and motion, not being in any time; and into this and
out of this what is in motion changes into rest, and what is at rest
So it appears.
And the one then, since it is at rest and also in motion, will
change to either, for only in this way can it be in both. And in
changing it changes in a moment, and when it is changing it will be in
no time, and will not then be either in motion or at rest.
It will not.
And it will be in the same case in relation to the other changes,
when it passes from being into cessation of being, or from not-being
into becoming-then it passes between certain states of motion and
rest, and, neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor is destroyed.
And on the same principle, in the passage from one to many and
from many to one, the one is neither one nor many, neither separated
nor aggregated; and in the passage from like to unlike, and from