they have no limit.
That is clear.
Then the others than the one, both as whole and parts, are infinite,
and also partake of limit.
Then they are both like and unlike one another and themselves.
How is that?
Inasmuch as they are unlimited in their own nature, they are all
affected in the same way.
And inasmuch as they all partake of limit, they are all affected
in the same way.
But inasmuch as their state is both limited and unlimited, they
are affected in opposite ways.
And opposites are the most unlike of things.
Considered, then, in regard to either one of their affections,
they will be like themselves and one another; considered in
reference to both of them together, most opposed and most unlike.
That appears to be true.
Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another?
And they are the same and also different from one another, and in
motion and at rest, and experience every sort of opposite affection,
as may be proved without difficulty of them, since they have been
shown to have experienced the affections aforesaid?
Suppose, now, that we leave the further discussion of these
matters as evident, and consider again upon the hypothesis that the