one is, whether opposite of all this is or is not equally true of
By all means.
Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the
affections of the others?
Let us ask that question.
Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from
Why, because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct
from both of them; for the expression "one and the others" includes
Yes, all things.
Then we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in
which both the one and the others might exist?
There is nothing.
Then the one and the others are never in the same?
Then they are separated from each other?
And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts?
Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if
it be separated from the others, and has no parts?
Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one,
if they do not partake either in whole or in part?
It would seem not.
Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in
themselves any unity?
There is not.
Nor are the others many; for if they were many, each part of them