being, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be?
Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being?
And has not-being also, if it is not?
But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state
Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies
And change is motion-we may say that?
And the one has been proved both to be and not to be?
And therefore is and is not in the same state?
Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because
it changes from being to not-being?
That appears to be true.
But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since
it is not, it cannot change from one place to another?
Then it cannot move by changing place?
Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same,
for the same is, and that which is not cannot be reckoned among things
Then the one, if it is not, cannot turn in that in which it is not?