to be one; but when seen near and with keen intellect, every single
thing appears to be infinite, since it is deprived of the one, which
Nothing more certain.
Then each of the others must appear to be infinite and finite, and
one and many, if others than the one exist and not the one.
Then will they not appear to be like and unlike?
In what way?
Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person
standing at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike?
But when you approach them, they appear to be many and different;
and because of the appearance of the difference, different in kind
from, and unlike, themselves?
And so must the particles appear to be like and unlike themselves
and each other.
And must they not be the same and yet different from one another,
and in contact with themselves, although they are separated, and
having every sort of motion, and every sort of rest, and becoming
and being destroyed, and in neither state, and the like, all which
things may be easily enumerated, if the one is not and the many are?
Once more, let us go back to the beginning, and ask if the one is
not, and the others of the one are, what will follow.
Let us ask that question.
In the first place, the others will not be one?
Nor will they be many; for if they were many one would be