contained in them. But if no one of them is one, all of them are
nought, and therefore they will not be many.
If there be no one in the others, the others are neither many nor
They are not.
Nor do they appear either as one or many.
Because the others have no sort or manner or way of communion with
any sort of not-being, nor can anything which is not, be connected
with any of the others; for that which is not has no parts.
Nor is there an opinion or any appearance of not-being in connection
with the others, nor is not-being ever in any way attributed to the
Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor any of the others
either as one or many; for you cannot conceive the many without the
Then if one is not, there is no conception of can be conceived to be
either one or many?
It would seem not.
Nor as like or unlike?
Nor as the same or different, nor in contact or separation, nor in
any of those states which we enumerated as appearing to be;-the others
neither are nor appear to be any of these, if one is not?
Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If
one is not, then nothing is?