conclusion, and on sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease
to argue or allow others to argue that the soul is a harmony.
Let me put the matter, Simmias, he said, in another point of view:
Do you imagine that a harmony or any other composition can be in a
state other than that of the elements out of which it is compounded?
Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer?
Then a harmony does not lead the parts or elements which make up the
harmony, but only follows them.
For harmony cannot possibly have any motion, or sound, or other
quality which is opposed to the parts.
That would be impossible, he replied.
And does not every harmony depend upon the manner in which the
elements are harmonized?
I do not understand you, he said.
I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a
harmony, and more completely a harmony, when more completely
harmonized, if that be possible; and less of a harmony, and less
completely a harmony, when less harmonized.
But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least
degree more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another?
Not in the least.
Yet surely one soul is said to have intelligence and virtue, and
to be good, and another soul is said to have folly and vice, and to be
an evil soul: and this is said truly?
But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of
this presence of virtue and vice in the soul?-Will they say that there
is another harmony, and another discord, and that the virtuous soul is