Soc. Only think, my good Phaedrus, what an utter want of delicacy
was shown in the two discourses; I mean, in my own and in that which
you recited out of the book. Would not any one who was himself of a
noble and gentle nature, and who loved or ever had loved a nature like
his own, when we tell of the petty causes of lovers' jealousies, and
of their exceeding animosities, and of the injuries which they do to
their beloved, have imagined that our ideas of love were taken from
some haunt of sailors to which good manners were unknown-he would
certainly never have admitted the justice of our censure?
Phaedr. I dare say not, Socrates.
Soc. Therefore, because I blush at the thought of this person, and
also because I am afraid of Love himself, I desire to wash the brine
out of my ears with water from the spring; and I would counsel
Lysias not to delay, but to write another discourse, which shall prove
that ceteris paribus the lover ought to be accepted rather than the
Phaedr. Be assured that he shall. You shall speak the praises of the
lover, and Lysias shall be compelled by me to write another
discourse on the same theme.
Soc. You will be true to your nature in that, and therefore I
Phaedr. Speak, and fear not.
Soc. But where is the fair youth whom I was addressing before, and
who ought to listen now; lest, if he hear me not, he should accept a
non-lover before he knows what he is doing?
Phaedr. He is close at hand, and always at your service.
Soc. Know then, fair youth, that the former discourse was the word
of Phaedrus, the son of Vain Man, who dwells in the city of Myrrhina
(Myrrhinusius). And this which I am about to utter is the
recantation of Stesichorus the son of Godly Man (Euphemus), who
comes from the town of Desire (Himera), and is to the following
effect: "I told a lie when I said" that the beloved ought to accept