thoughts which are present to our minds at the time are true; and
during one half of our lives we affirm the truth of the one, and,
during the other half, of the other; and are equally confident of
Theaet. Most true.
Soc. And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders?
the difference is only that the times are not equal.
Soc. And is truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time?
Theaet. That would be in many ways ridiculous.
Soc. But can you certainly determine: by any other means which of
these opinions is true?
Theaet. I do not think that I can.
Soc. Listen, then to a statement of the other side of the
argument, which is made by the champions of appearance. They would
say, as I imagine-can that which is wholly other than something,
have the same quality as that from which it differs? and observe,
-Theaetetus, that the word "other" means not "partially," but
Theaet. Certainly, putting the question as you do, that which is
wholly other cannot either potentially or in any other way be the
Soc. And must therefore be admitted to be unlike?
Soc. If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or
another, when it becomes like we call it the same-when unlike, other?
Soc. Were we not saying that there. are agents many and infinite,
and patients many and infinite?
Soc. And also that different combinations will produce results which
are not the same, but different?
Soc. Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:-There is
Socrates in health, and Socrates sick-Are they like or unlike?
Theaet. You mean to, compare Socrates in health as a whole, and
Socrates in sickness as a whole?
Soc. Exactly; that is my meaning.
Theaet. I answer, they are unlike.
Soc. And if unlike, they are other?
Soc. And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking,
or in any of the states which we were mentioning?
Theaet. I should.
Soc. All agents have a different patient in Socrates, accordingly as
he is well or ill.
Theaet. Of course.
Soc. And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will
produce something different in each of the two cases?
Soc. The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and
pleasant to me?
Soc. For, as has been already acknowledged, the patient and agent
meet together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness,
which are in simultaneous motion, and the perception which comes
from the patient makes the tongue percipient, and the quality of
sweetness which arises out of and is moving about the wine, makes
the wine, both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.
Theaet. Certainly; that has been already acknowledged.
Soc. But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a
Soc. The combination of the draught of wine, and the Socrates who is