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one, two, three, four, five, six; or when we say twice three, or three
times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we
speaking of the same or of different numbers?
Theaet. Of the same.
Soc. That is of six?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six?
Theaet. True.
Soc. Again, in speaking of all [in the plural] is there not one
thing which we express?
Theaet. Of course there is.
Soc. And that is six?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. Then in predicating the word "all" of things measured by
number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural?
Theaet. Clearly we do.
Soc. Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are
they not?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar
cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing?
Theaet. True.
Soc. And the number of each is the parts of each?
Theaet. Exactly.
Soc. Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts?
Theaet. Clearly.
Soc. But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire
number is the all?
Theaet. True.
Soc. Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the
all, if consisting of all the parts?
Theaet. That is the inference.
Soc. But is a part a part of anything but the whole?
Theaet. Yes, of the all.
Soc. You make a valiant defence, Theaetetus. And yet is not the
all that of which nothing is wanting?
Theaet. Certainly.
Soc. And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is
absent? but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole
nor all;-if wanting in anything, both equally lose their entirety of
Theaet. I now think that there is no difference between a whole
and all.
Soc. But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the
parts will be a whole and all?
Theaet. Certainly.
Soc. Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be
that either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters
are not parts of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same
with the letters, and will therefore be equally known with them?
Theaet. You are right.
Soc. And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of
any other parts of syllables, which are not letters?
Theaet. No, indeed, Socrates; for if I admit the existence of
parts in a syllable, it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters
and seek for other parts.
Soc. Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present
view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form?
Theaet. True.

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